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A B S T R A C T
We derive and estimate a model of demand for Geographical Indications allowing for subjective and hetero-
geneous quality perceptions, and study vertical differentiation based on multi-tier quality labels within the
context of the strategy adopted by the Chianti Consortium. Quality perceptions and wine choices are elicited in
an online experiment where the number of quality tiers is augmented incrementally in a between-subject design.
The empirical model includes subjective quality perceptions as an (endogenous) explanatory variable, and un-
explained heterogeneity in WTP for quality as a random parameter. We find that quality perceptions are en-
dogenous to the labeling regime, and adding a high-quality label (Chianti Classico Gran Selezione) decreases the
perceived quality of all other Chianti wines, but not the competitor wines. However, the market shared lost to
perception restructuring is small compared to the benefits of increased vertical differentiation.
1. Introduction
In 2013 the Consortium of wine producers in the Chianti Classico
Geographical Indication (GI henceforth) agreed to introduce the “Gran
Selezione” (Great Selection), a quality certification label, to promote an
“upward expansion of the oenological offer of the Chianti territory”.1
As worthwhile as this endeavour may seem, the move raised con-
troversy among the members of the Consortium, as a Decanter article
reported (Brook, 2014). After all, designations of origin tied to the
Tuscan region already featured multiple tiers of quality labels, in-
cluding Chianti, Chianti Classico, and Chianti Classico Riserva. Would
the new label bring real value to Chianti producers or just increase
bureaucratic costs? Would the Gran Selezione benefit some producers
while damaging others?
Having established a large body of theoretical and empirical work
on minimum quality standards and GIs,2 economists are well set to
address such questions. Briefly, in markets for experience (Nelson,
1970) and credence (Darby and Karni, 1973) goods, quality labels can
increase the number of consumers’ choices and, at the same time, allow
producers to price above marginal cost (Zago and Pick, 2004). The
empirical task, therefore, is to determine the share of consumers willing
to pay for the higher quality label, evaluate substitution patterns, and
consider costs.3
As it often turns out however, not all questions raised by the
winemakers are so straightforward. Giovanni Poggiali’s of Felsina
Winery for example was concerned that “if we present our single-vi-
neyard Rancia as Gran Selezione, then consumers will assume our other
top wines such as our pure-Sangiovese Fontalloro are not as good”
(Brook, 2014). Mr. Poggiali’s thought points to two important concepts
typically not considered in the GI literature: first, that even though
quality standards linked to Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) are
an objectively-defined set of practices, consumers will interpret the
label subjectively. Second, and perhaps more crucially, that perceived
quality is a contextual and comparative concept—production processes
and sensory characteristics may remain unaltered, but the Chianti
Classicos not making the cut for the Gran Selezione may lose prestige,
just like the release of a “new and improved” phone cheapens the feel of
the one we hold in our pocket.
The objective of this article is to establish a theoretical framework to
study vertical differentiation via multi-tier GI quality certifications, test
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whether restructuring of perceptions effects of the type suggested by
Mr. Poggiali can be detected and quantified, and understand the pros
and cons of the strategy adopted by the Chianti Classico consortium. As
the question is fundamentally empirical, our approach relies on an
online experiment where consumers’ quality perceptions and product
choices are elicited under different labeling scenarios. The type of
heuristics we have in mind are similar to those considered in the pro-
duct line and umbrella branding literature, where upward or downward
brand extensions affect consumers’ perceptions of all the products
marketed by the same brand (Chintagunta, 1996; Heath et al., 2011).
The introduction of higher quality products is generally thought to in-
crease brand equity (Randall et al., 1998) and possibly market power
(Kadiyali et al., 1998), but it is also possible for the strategy to backfire
and damage the differentiating brand (Caldieraro et al., 2015).
Chianti producers have been pursuing a strategy of quality stan-
dards and product differentiation for centuries4; and this is no hy-
perbole. The Lega del Chianti was founded in Florence in the thirteenth
century to regulate administrative relations with the leading producers
of a red wine made with Sangiovese grapes from the Chianti region, and
the first notarial document in which the name Chianti is used to refer to
wines produced in that region dates to 1398. In 1716 the Grand Duke
Cosimo III de’ Medici issued a decree in Florence specifying the
boundaries of the areas in which Chianti wines could be produced, and
set up a Congregation to oversee the production, shipping, fraud-control
and marketing of wine.
As the popularity of Chianti wines increased through the centuries,
the acreage and region of production expanded beyond the traditional
boundaries, but in 1932 the modern Consortium protecting the au-
thenticity of Chianti wines established the Chianti Classico label and its
distinctive red rooster trademark to identify the wines produced within
the historical (1716) region, differentiating them from the more generic
wines produced in the broader Chianti. In 1984, Chianti obtained the
DOCG designation (Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita -
Denomination of Controlled and Guaranteed Origin), which is awarded
to wines of certified origin with codified production processes and
guaranteed wine quality; while in 1996 the Chianti Classico became a
DOCG independent of the broader Chianti DOCG.
Table 1 portrays the main production differences between the two
denominations. Chianti Classico wines with higher alcohol content
(> 12.5%) with at least two years of aging may be further qualified as
Reserve (Chianti Classico Riserva). The “Gran Selezione” label (Great
Selection) identifies a limited number of wines meeting very stringent
quality standards (including approval by a tasting commission). It is
important to note that this type of multi-tier labelling strategy is not
unique to Chianti. Rosso di Montalcino and Brunello di Montalcino for
example are wines produced exclusively in the territory of the Muni-
cipality of Montalcino, but quality standards are much more stringent
for Brunello than for Rosso, so that the two wines are sold at very
different price points (see Table 1).
The theory of vertical differentiation via GI (Zago and Pick, 2004;
Moschini et al., 2008; Menapace and Moschini, 2011; Mérel and Sexton,
2012) generally assumes that certification of production processes
communicates a certain quality level (e.g. high vs. low), and the in-
terpretation of a signal is not affected by the presence/absence of other
labels. This is reasonable when each region certifies a single label,
segmenting the market into unlabeled vs. GI product, but less so for the
case of the multi-tier strategy adopted in the Chianti and other viti-
cultural areas (e.g. Montalcino, Bordeaux). A contribution of this article
is therefore to examine how multi-tier quality labels affect the dis-
tribution of the quality marketed under a given GI, and then model how
consumers’ perceptions may change in response.
The context and modeling assumptions are tied to the regulations
surrounding the European Protected Designations of Origin, where a
causal link between labeled production practices and product quality is
established (EU 1151/2012).5 In addition to informing consumers and
supporting a diversified food production, the stated objectives of Eur-
opean regulations include guaranteeing the profitability for producers
of traditional agricultural products as a rural development strategy
(Gragnani, 2013). The analysis of consumer perceptions and choices we
developed here allows us to offer some considerations on the conditions
under which multi-tier GI certifications can promote such objectives,
but also raise some caveats related to distributional effects.
The first hypothesis we raise regarding consumer perceptions fol-
lows the standard assumption that consumers are both rational and well
informed about the certification standards, so that perceptions match
the expected quality marketed under each label (e.g. Zago and Pick,
2004). The second and third hypotheses waive rational expectations to
integrate Steenkamp’ (1990) model of quality perceptions, positing that
the interpretation of food labels results from a subject-object interac-
tion, and is “neither completely subjective nor wholly objective
(p.312)”. In this context food labels and production practices are es-
sentially quality cues which consumers use to infer important quality
traits (Messer et al., 2017) according to an individual’s knowledge and
beliefs.
Even though wine consumption can certainly inform quality per-
ceptions, the signaling role of labels remains central for two main
reasons. First, in a market with a vast number of differentiated products
(such as wine), the number of consumers having direct experience is
generally small compared to first-time, uninformed buyers. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, ample evidence shows that labels and other
signals can influence (or bias) quality perceptions, even after con-
sumption. For example, information about the high price of a wine not
only makes people express higher quality ratings after tasting (as in
Almenberg and Dreber, 2011), but has been shown to influence the very
neural processes activated by pleasant experiences (Plassmann et al.,
2008). Similarly, identical cookies seem to taste better when labeled as
organic (Lee et al., 2013).
As Verdú et al. point out (2004), “[consumers] are not experts and
probably do not know anything about the processes involved in the
production and ageing of wines”. Teuber (2011) finds that, even among
the very consumers of a GI product (Hessian apple cider) “consumers’
awareness and knowledge about GI is very limited”. One can therefore
hypothesize that a Gran Selezione may be interpreted as a signal of
higher quality, but consumers unfamiliar with GI regulations may na-
ïvely interpret the label as a newly developed high-quality product
(rather than, at least in part, a reclassification of existing wines). Fol-
lowing this logic, a testable hypothesis is that perceptions of other
Chianti wines may be independent of the presence/absence of the Gran
Selezione. Lastly, if we accept that quality perceptions are inherently
subjective, then systematic and heuristic biases (see for example
Kahneman et al., 1991) may play an important role. The “comparative
stigma” idea raised by Mr. Poggiali follows this logic, suggesting that
the presence of a Gran Selezione may cheapen the perceived quality of
all other wines marketed under the Chianti umbrella, and is the third
hypothesis we test.
Having relaxed the assumption that consumers’ perceptions ne-
cessarily match the expected quality output under each labeling stan-
dard, we derive a model of demand for experience goods based on the
4 See Meloni and Swinnen (2018) for a detailed historical account of wine GIs
in Europe.
5 Geographical Indications in the European Union include Protected
Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indications (PGI). For
PGIs, producers need to be able to establish a clear link between quality
characteristics and an agricultural region. PDOs additionally require that the
whole production process takes place in the defined geographical area. The
DOCG (Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita) label used for
Chianti is a PDO scheme. See https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/
schemes_en.
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Mussa and Rosen (1978) framework, expanding the GI literature to
consider the case of multi-tier certifications with quality perceptions
endogenous to the labeling regime. The model is used to show how
changes in market shares following the introduction of a new label can
be parsed into two separate effects: choice availability, linked to the
fraction of consumers who prefer higher quality, and perception re-
structuring, whose effects cannot be signed a priori. Then, we use data
from a choice experiment to estimate the model, predict market shares,
and quantify each effect.
The importance of distinguishing preferences from beliefs/percep-
tions to understand food choices has also been raised by recent ex-
perimental work on food labels (Lusk et al., 2013; Costanigro et al.,
2015), even though not in the context of GIs. This distinction may seem
purely academic to some: whatever the cause, an ex-ante investigation
(e.g. via lab or choice experiment) of the share of consumers who will
buy the Gran Selezione, and the implied substitution patterns (i.e.
cannibalization of other Chianti wines vs. market gains against com-
petitors), would provide all the information wine makers need to sup-
port it or oppose it. This view, however, misses some important im-
plications.
The overarching issue is the identification problem raised by Manski
(2004): if observed choices are consistent with multiple combinations
of subjective beliefs (in this case, about product quality) and pre-
ferences (i.e. WTP for quality), then identifying preferences from choice
data requires knowing or observing consumers’ beliefs. Were the new
label unsuccessful, the consortium would want to know if consumers
are just happy with the quality of a lower tier Chianti Classico (sug-
gestive of market saturation), or because they don’t think that a Gran
Selezione will differ that much from a Classico (implying a need for
further differentiation or consumer messaging), and this cannot be as-
certained by simply observing or estimating market shares.
To measure how multi-tier labels influence quality perceptions we
designed four between-subject scenarios with an increasing number of
competing quality standards, and then asked participants to rate pro-
duct quality of each GI label via Likert scales. The use of psychometric
or other subjective (Likert-type) constructs to explain WTP for labels
has been proposed before (Costanigro et al., 2014a, 2014b; Malone and
Lusk, 2017b) and has some clearly appealing features. For one, Likert
scales are easily understood by survey participants, even in an online
setting, and it is no coincidence that wine magazines (Wine Spectator,
Wine Enthusiast, Decanter etc.) and consumer review websites (e.g.
Vivino.com) use a similar system to report quality ratings (i.e. 1–100
scores or 1–5 stars). The representation of quality differences on a
linear spectrum is also consistent with the vast body of theory on
asymmetric information, from Akerlof (1970) and Mussa and Rosen
(1978), to the work on minimum quality standards (Leland, 1979;
Shapiro, 1983; Bockstael, 1984; Boom, 1995) and GI labeling (Winfree
and McCluskey, 2005; Moschini et al., 2008; Menapace and Moschini,
2011).
One significant drawback of Likert scales, however, is that they are
notoriously susceptible to framing effects. Here, we borrow a remedy
from the multiple price list experimental literature (see Andersen et al.,
2006) by randomly assigning participants to two different types of
elicitation scales, controlling econometrically for framing effects. The
use of stated (rather than revealed) preference methods also comes with
the standard caveats (see for example Brooks and Lusk, 2010), but
choice experiments are particularly well suited to investigate the re-
search questions examined here. Just like vertical differentiation
models abstract from quantity (assuming that consumers purchase only
one product) to study price-quality relationships, choice experiments
require participants to select one preferred product within a choice set,
isolating the tradeoffs central to a model of vertical differentiation.
Indeed, the close analogy between the theoretical and empirical model
is a prominent strength of the approach we propose. With measure-
ments of quality perceptions in hand, one can estimate a choice model
where product quality appears as a right-hand-side variable, as it is
customary in virtually all vertical differentiation models.
While the advantages of controlling for quality perceptions are
substantive, it is also true that the use of subjective constructs as re-
gressors begs the question of endogeneity, and the design of a careful
instrumentation strategy. After all, perceptions are by definition idio-
syncratic, and therefore potentially correlated with the residual.
Acknowledging this problem, we implement a two-pronged in-
strumentation strategy. First, a series of subject-specific, randomized
information treatments designed to induce exogenous variation in
quality perceptions, a methodology similar to the one adopted by Teisl
and Roe (2010) to control for endogenous beliefs while estimating WTP
to avoid foodborne pathogens. Second, we use perceptions relative to
one label as instruments for another, following the strategy proposed by
Gergaud et al. (2017, for endogenous collective reputations) and
Malone and Lusk (2017a, for beer quality perceptions). A model of
choice with subjective perceptions and heterogeneous (random) pre-
ferences for quality is then estimated adopting a control function ap-
proach (Petrin and Train, 2010) to correct for endogeneity. Estimated
parameters are then used to predict market shares before and after the
introduction of the new quality tier, while separating the effects of
perception restructuring from choice availability effects induced by the
introduction of the Gran Selezione. We conclude by examining the
policy implications of the multi-tier differentiation strategy from the
perspective of a GI vs. the individual firm.
2. Conceptual model and theoretical framework
In this section we develop a formal model of how multi-tier labels
tied to the adoption of increasingly stringent quality standards may
affect product quality, consumer perceptions and purchasing choices.
The general framework draws from Moschini et al. (2008), with some
major modifications. On the supply side, we consider the more realistic
Table 1













Area (Hectares) 71,800 7000 7000 700 3600 3600
Maximum Production (Ton/
Hectare)
9 7.5 7.5 7.5 9 8
Min % Sangiovese 70 80 80 80 100 100
Min % Alcohol 12 12 12.5 13 12 12.5
Min Aging (Months) 3 10 24 30 12 60
Mandatory Bottling on Premises No No No Yes No No
Approval by Tasting
Commission
No No No Yes No Yes
Median Market Price (IRI,
2015)
€6 €13 €20 €25 €9 €30
a Source: authors elaboration from www.consorziovinochianti.it, www.chianticlassico.com.
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case where some producers surpass the minimum quality standards
imposed by the GI regulation, so that a label is tied to a distribution of
quality, rather than a precise level. On the demand side, we model GI
labels as cues influencing a consumer’s subjective perception of quality,
rather than an objective measurement uniformly interpreted by all
consumers. The model developed here is quite general, but we present
it within the context of the Chianti consortium differentiation strategy,
where four labels were progressively introduced: Chianti (C), Chianti
Classico (CC), Chianti Classico Riserva (CCR) and Chianti Classico Gran
Selezione (CCGS).
Assume first that, in the absence of GI labeling, quality is uniformly
distributed according to q U q q[ , ]min max , where qmin represents the
minimum quality imposed on all products (e.g. to meet food safety
standards and adulteration laws), and qmax is the maximum quality
achievable with the known technology. Therefore, the mean quality of
an unlabeled wine is =µ q q1/2( )max min . One may wonder why a firm
would ever produce at a quality level above qmin in an experience good
market where information about quality is asymmetric. The rationale is
that market equilibria where products surpassing minimum quality
standards are offered can be supported by firm reputation dynamics
(see Shapiro, 1983; Menapace and Moschini, 2011). While we do not
directly model and abstract from firm reputations, they are un-
doubtedly present in the wine (see Costanigro et al., 2010) and many
other food industries, countering the free-ride incentive induced by the
collective GI labeling (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005, Costanigro et al.,
2012).
Consider now the effect of the gradual introduction of four in-
creasingly stringent minimum quality standards, and assume that the
production processes codified by the differentiating labels (Table 1)
alter the quality of the product in some objective way, so that< < < < <q q q q q qC CC CCR CCGSmin min min min min max holds. That is, the model
considers the case of a GI imposing meaningful standards, and not just
leveraging generic ethnocentric consumer preferences (as in Desquilbet
and Monier-Dilhan, 2015). We also assume that all producers in the GI
who surpass a certain standard qlmin, =l C,CC,CCR,CCGS, will auto-
matically qualify for the use of the label.
Let now k represent the number of quality standards under a given
GI label. When the first label is introduced ( =k 1), the quality dis-
tribution of a wine (in this case, Chianti DOCG) is =q U q q[ , ]kC C1 min max ,
with mean quality ==µ q q1/2( )kC C1 max min , greater than the average
quality of an unlabeled wine µ. Then, Chianti Classico wines are in-
troduced, with =q U q q[ , ]kCC CC2 min max and ==µ q q1/2( )kCC CC2 max min . The
important point here is that all Chianti wines meeting the minimum
quality standard qCCmin are relabeled as CC, so that the quality distribution
of C wines changes to =q U q q[ , ]kC C CC2 min min , with ==µ q q1/2( )kC CC C2 min min
and < <= = =µ µ µkC kC kCC2 1 2. The Chianti Classico Riserva is introduced in
stage three, with =q U q q[ , ]kCCR CCR3 min max and ==µ q q1/2( )kCCR CCR3 max min .
Again, a percentage of the CC wines are reclassified as CCR, so that
=q U q q[ , ]kCC CC CCR3 min min and ==µ q q1/2( )kCC CCR CC3 min min . However, the quality
of C wines remains unaltered, i.e. == =µ µkC kC3 2, as no C wines are re-
classified at =k 3. This leapfrog game, where the newly introduced
“top quality” label steals the upper end of the quality spectrum from the
runner-up continues in stage four, when CCGS is introduced.
The central question we raise relates to how the introduction of
new, more stringent GI standards changes perceptions for the labels
previously released, and whether or not such changes conform to the
conclusions we can draw from this “objective” model of quality. Letting
qik
l represent the quality perception associated by consumer i to label l
under a regime of k labels, one first hypothesis is that any mistake in
judgement is Gaussian white noise and, on average, consumers are both
rational and well informed. In such case, the mean (across the consumer
population) quality perception E q[ ]ikl will conform to the rankings im-
plied by the previous model of quality. Focusing on the introduction of
the Gran Selezione, the rational & informed hypothesis implies the fol-
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Alternatively, naive and uninformed consumers may assume that new
GI labels certify newly introduced products, taking the new quality
standards as independent from other existing labels. This would imply
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Lastly, the comparative stigma hypothesis suggests that perceptions
are endogenous to the labeling regime, and more specifically that in-
troducing higher quality labels (i.e. with more stringent standards) will
damage the perceived quality of all lower tier products. In terms of
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We now turn our attention to modeling how restructuring of quality
perceptions may affect demand for experience goods after the in-
troduction of a new label. The task is to separate changes in market
shares owed to the availability of a new, higher quality choice from the
effects attributable to restructuring of perceptions. This is simpler to
accomplish by ignoring, for now, cross-consumer heterogeneity in
perceptions. So, let qkl represent the quality consumers associate to label
l under a regime of k competing quality standards labels. Adopting the
Mussa and Rosen (1978) framework, consumers’ utility depends on
product quality, price, and a parameter ( )i capturing the propensity for
buying high quality, i.e. U q p( , , )i .
The utility of alternative choices when only one label, C, is available
can be represented as:






Letting == =k C pq10 CkC 1 represent the marginal WTP for quality of aconsumer who is indifferent between buying nothing and making a
purchase, imposing strictly positive quality perceptions/prices and
under the typical (Akerlof, 1970; Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Shapiro,
1983; Moschini et al., 2008) simplifying assumption that
Uniform[0, 1]; one can represent the demand for Chianti in a
market of N consumers as == =x N [1 ]kC k C1 10 , while =N [ ]k C10 con-
sumers will buy nothing (i.e., the market is uncovered).
Now consider the introduction of the Chianti Classico (CC), and
assume that perceptions and prices under this two-labels regime con-
forms with the inequalities >= =q qkCC kC2 2 and >p pCC C ; but it is possible
that = =q qkC kC2 1. That is, the presence of CC wines may change how
consumers view C wines. The implied choice becomes:










The indifference points now are == =k C pq20 CkC 2 (from buying nothing to
purchasing C) and == = =kC CC p pq q2 ( )(~ ~ )CC CkCC kC2 2 (from buying C to purchasing CC),
with demands == = =x N [ ]kC kC CC k C2 2 20 and == =x N [1 ]kCC kC CC2 2 ; while
=N [ ]k C20 will buy nothing. So, the change in demand for C following the
introduction of CC can be expressed as:
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== = = = =x x N [( ) ].kC kC k C k C kC CC1 2 20 10 2 (6)
Eq. (6) details how the reduction in demand for C after CC wines
become available can be attributed to two distinct factors: one owed to
perceptions restructuring (embedded in the term = =[ ]k C k C20 10 ), and one
owed to “choice availability” (captured by =kC CC2 ), where some consumers
prefer to buy higher quality when made available. This decomposition
could be also derived for the case of three and four labels =k( 3, 4) and,
depending on how consumers adjust perceptions after the introduction
of a new label, the perception restructuring effect will be zero (naïve
consumers), affect only the k 1th label (rational and informed), or all
labels marketed under a given GI (comparative stigma).
We now introduce heterogeneous quality perceptions and frame the
fundamental structure for the empirical model of choice we are set to
estimate. Assume that a consumer faces a choice between =l L1, ...,
different labels, and qil represents how consumer i perceives label l, so
that




When an empirical measure of qil is available, as in our case, the
corresponding empirical parameterization would be:= + + + =U p q l Lfor 1, ..., ;il l il i il il (8)
where l is a label-specific intercept, ( 1) is the marginal utility of
money and i is the marginal utility of quality.
Unexplained heterogeneity in the valuation of quality, represented
as a random variable with given density function in theory models, can
be mirrored in the empirical setting by specifying a single parameter
(i.e. i the valuation of quality) as a random coefficient (McFadden and
Train, 2000). By directly controlling for quality perceptions, we avoid
confounding heterogeneity in WTP for quality and variation in quality
perceptions, which leads to ambiguous results and potentially mis-
construed interpretations (Lusk et al., 2013). Estimation can be ac-
complished by assuming a specific density f ( ), and then estimating
E [ ]i and Var [ ]i via maximum simulated likelihood (McFadden and
Train, 2000).
Letting the error term il be distributed iid extreme value (in-
dependent over labels), the probability that consumer i will prefer label
l takes the mixed logit form
= + ++ +P p qp q f dexp( )exp( ) ( ) .il l il i ill l il i il (9)
One substantive problem with the model in Eqs. (8) and (9) is that
consistent estimation of discrete choice models requires exogenous
(independent of il) explanatory variables, implying that the use of the
subjective quality perceptions qil as right-hand-side variables may
produce biased estimates. To amend the problem, we adopt the control
function approach proposed by Petrin and Train (2010), where re-
siduals obtained by regressing the potentially endogenous variable on a
set of instruments are included as an additional regressor in the choice
model. The procedure requires expressing the endogenous variable as a
function of observed instruments zil and unobserved factors µil corre-
lated with il, as in= +q W µz( , ) ;il il il (10)
where zil is independent of il and µil. If Eq. (10) can be estimated, then
the residuals µil can be included (8), thereby controlling for en-
dogeneity.
3. Experimental design and survey description
To estimate the model in Eq. (8), we conducted an online choice
experiment where both quality perceptions and product choices were
elicited. The experimental design was first obtained for a scenario
including a full palette of differentiated Chianti wines (C, CC, CCR
CCGS), a competitor wine (either Rosso di Montalcino DOC or Brunello
di Montalcino DOCG, at random), and a “none of the above” option.
The Montalcino wines are ideal competitors, as they also are San-
giovese-based Tuscan wines with multi-tier quality labels.
Consistently with the focus of the vertical differentiation models in
(8), only two attributes were included: the wine (as defined by the GI
label) and its price. As the price range of a Brunello and an entry-level
Chianti will never overlap in the real world, we opted for a labeled
choice experiment with price levels specific to each GI label (see Bekker-
Grob et al., 2010 for a discussion of labeled vs. unlabeled or generic
experiments). Median market prices were obtained using scanner data
(€6, €13, €20, and €25 for C, CC, CCR, and CCGR, €9 and €30 for Rosso
and Brunello; IRI Infoscan, 2015), and price levels in the experiment
varied above and below each median (4 levels: median ± 20% and
median ± 30%). Based on these attributes and levels, a fractional fac-
torial orthogonal design of 12 choice sets was obtained using Ngene©.
Four between-subject, randomized experimental treatments were
implemented with the purpose of simulating choices under the four
scenarios =k( 1, ...,4) of increasing vertical differentiation. In scenario I
(150 participants) only the base (C) Chianti wine was available, sce-
nario II (250 participants) included both C and CC, scenario III (300
participants) had C, CC and CCR, and scenario IV (500 participants)
presented the full palette of four Chianti wines. In all treatments, each
choice set included one or more Chianti options, a competitor wine
(Rosso or Brunello), and the opt-out “none of these wines” alternative.
Wine marketing research has shown that consumers may value different
attributes/qualities depending on the occasion of consumption (Quester and
Smart, 1998) and price segment (Costanigro et al., 2007). Given the extent
of differentiation between the wines included in our experiment, it is quite
plausible that a wine preferred for an everyday consumption situation
would not be selected for a special occasion, and vice versa. To provide
additional context to the choice scenario, two purchasing questions were
posed in each choice set: (1) which wine would one purchase for everyday
consumption (“consumo quotidiano”) and (2) which wine would one pur-
chase for a special occasion (“occasione speciale”). A choice set extracted
from the design for scenario IV is presented in Fig. 1.
3.1. Survey flow
The online survey was administered to a panel of Italian red wine
consumers by a specialized marketing firm in August 2015. The sample
was stratified to match, within the limits of an online survey, the sta-
tistics on gender, age and region of residence of the Italian population.
Randomized information treatment: after the initial screening questions,
participants were exposed to a randomized information treatment. The ra-
tionale of this treatment was introducing exogenous variation in perceived
quality, thereby creating a set of instrumental variables to estimate Eq. (10).
The full information set comprised a total of eight screenshots, presenting
formal descriptions and definitions of the wine labels to appear in the choice
experiment. This included a definition of a Protected Designation of Origin
(Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita, or DOCG), the meaning
and use of the term “riserva” (reserve) in Chianti wines, and one statement
describing the region of production, allowed grape varieties and the pro-
duction/selection process of each wine label appearing in the choice ex-
periment. Finally, the schematic summary of the production protocols
adopted for each label in Table 1 was also used as an information treatment.
The total number of treatments assigned to each participant, the specific
information bullets presented and their ordering were all randomized, while
the information set to draw from was kept consistent with the extant la-
beling regime (Scenario I-Scenario IV).6 To stimulate participants’ attention
to the information treatments, each screenshot was displayed for a
6 For example, for participants in scenario III Table 1 would not include the
information about CCGS.
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minimum of 20 s, as in McFadden and Lusk (2015).
Elicitation of quality expectations: after the information treatment,
participants were asked to rate the quality of the wines in the labeling
scenario, so that an empirical measure of qil in Eq. (8) would be
available. Participants located each product on a scale ranging from
lower to higher quality (minore qualità, maggiore qualità, see Fig. 2),
with no other numerical markings, and numerical values in partitioning
the quality spectrum were assigned only later for econometrical pur-
poses. To account and control for possible framing effects, perceptions
were elicited using one of two survey tools (at random). In one case,
participants used label-specific sliding bars going from lower to higher
quality (see Fig. 2, upper panel). In the second case, participants were
instructed to communicate perceptions by dragging and dropping each
wine label on a single line representing the quality spectrum, from
lower to higher (see Fig. 2, lower). Participants who used this rating
tool were also informed that, if two wines were similar in quality, the
labels could be overlapped. With both tools, the order in which the
wines were presented on the screen was randomized to avoid sug-
gesting an implicit ordering in the quality of the wines.
Choice experiment and closing questions: after eliciting quality per-
ceptions, each subject answered the 12 choice sets of the previously de-
scribed experiment. The last section of the survey asked a series of ques-
tions related to an individual’s typical wine consumption, his or her
familiarity with the wines presented in the experiment, a self-assessment of
wine expertise (1–10, low to high), family income and food expenditure.
4. Empirical estimation and results
Table 2 presents the average quality perceptions (elicited with the
tools presented in Fig. 2 and projected to a 0–100 numerical scale)
across labeling regime. A first result is that there is little doubt that
quality perceptions for Chianti wines change across scenario. A non-
parametric k-sample test for equality of medians7 strongly rejects the
null hypothesis for all Chianti wines, while the same hypothesis is re-
jected at = 0.05 for the Rosso wines (but not at = 0.01), and not
rejected at any conventional level of significance for Brunello.
Some patterns can also be easily devised. For the entry level Chianti
(C), elicited perceptions decline from an average of 71 (scenario I) to 64
(sc. II), 59 (sc. III) and finally 53 (sc. IV). The same, unequivocal de-
clining pattern across treatments can be also discerned for CC and CCR.
The variation in the perception of Rosso and Brunello, on the other
hand, appears erratic for the case of Rosso, and minor for Brunello.
Nonparametric fits comparing quality perceptions for Chianti C and
Brunello across scenario I and IV (Fig. 3) display a notable change in the
distribution of perceptions for C wines, but not Brunello.
A formal test of hypotheses (1)–(3) can be carried out in a simple
form by using the data from Scenarios III and IV, and regressing the
perceived quality of a wine on a dummy variable indicating Scenario IV
(plus a constant term), so that changes in perceptions between scenarios
are measured by the dummy coefficient. To ascertain the robustness of
our results, the regression is estimated separately for the data from the
likert vs. the drag-and-drop elicitation tools. Results are also included in
Table 2. As one can note, the coefficient for the Scenario IV dummy
variable is negative and significant for all Chianti wines (the one ex-
ception is CCR with likert data, which is still negative but non-
significant), implying that the perceived quality of C, CC, and CCR is
lower when a GS option is available. This results is inconsistent with
both the rational & informed, and the naïve & uniformed hypotheses,
while the comparative stigma hypothesis is not rejected. As a falsifi-
cation test, the same regression was estimated for Rosso and Brunello,
and we find that the corresponding estimates are non-significant.
To build the control function, the model of quality perceptions in Eq.
(10) was first estimated via seemingly unrelated regressions (i.e. SUR,
Zellner, 1962) where the perceived quality of each wine was regressed on
the randomized information treatments (see Teisl and Roe, 2010), quality
elicitation tools, and cross-label perceptions (Gergaud et al., 2017; Malone
and Lusk, 2017a). That is qi l, the perceptions associated with labels other
than l, are used to predict =qi l. Results for the preferred model specifica-
tion in scenarios III (lower panel) and IV (upper panel) are summarized in
Table 3.8 Each column presents the results for each wine included in the
system of equations (C, CC, CCR, CCGS, Brunello, Rosso), while the hor-
izontal rows reports regressors and estimated coefficients. In general, the
randomized information treatments were only mildly effective at changing
quality perceptions. The description of the cultural practices of a given
label (InfoLabel) is never significant, while increasing the number of in-
formational facts presented (InfoNum) have some cumulative effect for the
higher quality labels. Presenting Table 1 (CompTable) was the most ef-
fective information treatment, perhaps because of its inherent comparative
layout. Participants who were randomly assigned to the drag-and-drop
(Frame1=1) elicitation tool tended to assign lower quality scores than
those who used the likert scale (Frame1=0). Cross-label perceptions, on
the other end, tend to correlate rather strongly.
Table 4 presents the choice and market value shares for everyday con-
sumption vs. special occasion, broken down by the randomized competitor
(Rosso or Brunello). As price levels fluctuated above and below real median
market prices and the experimental design is balanced (for all wines, each of
Fig. 1. A screenshot showing a choice set including four Chianti labels (Scenario IV) and Brunello as competitor wine.
7 Results for parametric tests of equality of means are analogous, but they rely
on the stronger and assumption of multivariate normality, so we do not report
them.
8 Results for scenarios II and I are analogous, but we omit them for brevity. An
earlier version of this article used information treatments and a set of de-
scriptors capturing a participant’s knowledge about wine were also included,
similarly to Teisl and Roe (2010). Results are robust to either one of the ap-
proaches, but the use of cross-label perceptions results in a more predictive
model for Eq. (10).
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the four price levels occurs three times), the choice shares do have rea-
sonable external validity.9 Several facts are noteworthy.
First, everyday consumption and special occasion choices have a
very different distribution of shares, as one would expect. When pur-
chasing a wine for a meal at home, the preferred wines are the base
Chianti and Rosso, with very few consumers willing to pay the high
prices of a CCGS or Brunello. To the contrary, special occasion choices
tend to gravitate towards the higher quality wines available (i.e. CCR,
CCGS, Brunello), even though they are quite more expensive. It is also
clear that Rosso can compete (i.e., gain significant shares) with Chianti
wines in both every day and special occasion purchases, while Brunello
Fig. 2. Quality perception elicitation tools: Likert scale (Frame 1) and Drag-and-Drop Tool (Frame 2).
9 An anonymous reviewer noted that, as the land in a GI is finite, the in-
troduction of a new tier would change the supply schedule for the other wines
over the longer term, possibly raising prices. This effect, if present, it is not
captured here.
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is often preferred for special occasions, but is probably considered too
expensive for an everyday meal.
The second point worth noticing is that introducing higher tier
Chianti labels causes minimal changes in the shares of everyday con-
sumption choices. Indeed, CC, CCR and CCGS obtain relatively small
choice shares in all scenarios, especially when Rosso is available as
competitor (however, value share are somewhat higher). The one dis-
cernible pattern is the reduction in opt-out choices as the number of
available choices increases, but base Chianti and Rosso jointly maintain
approximately 70% of the choice shares (across scenarios, irrespective
of the presence of the higher quality wines.
Things are quite different for special occasion choices. In this case, for
all labeling treatments the preferred Chianti wine is consistently the
highest tier available, implying that consumers felt somewhat con-
strained in the treatments with fewer choices. Based on the results in
Table 4, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of CCR, CCGS and
Brunello sales relate to special occasion purchases. This is consistent with
the findings of other wine marketing studies relating wine choices to the
occasion of consumption (e.g. Hall et al., 2001; Quester and Smart, 1998;
Boncinelli et al., 2019) which, while lower in volume, sustain the more
profitable premium and ultra-premium markets (Bidmead, 2012).
Given the nature of our hypotheses and our interest for the effects of
introducing the GS, we focus our modeling efforts and ensuing analysis
on the special occasion choices, as they are more likely to be influenced
by both the choice availability and perception restructuring effects (Eq.
(6)) we aim to isolate. The empirical specification of the random WTP
for quality model in Eq. (8), includes alternative-specific intercepts, the
quality perceptions elicited in the experiment (QualExp), and the con-
trol function (Resid); which in scenario IV takes the form:
= + + + ++ + + + +U (NONE) CC CCR CCGS BrunelloRosso Price QualExp Resid ;ij j j j jj i ij ij ij0 j 02 03 04 0506 1 2 3 (11)
where i2 is the single random parameter.
The first four column in Table 5 present the results from estimating
Eq. (11) separately in each scenario. Price coefficients are negative in
all treatments, with the exception of scenario IV, where it is non-sig-
nificant. The estimate for the mean marginal utility of quality E ( )i2 , the
coefficient of the variable QualExp, is positive throughout the four
samples, with significant and positive standard deviation (SD QualExp).
The latter parameter provides a direct measure of dispersion of the
valuation of quality in the consumer population, which we find to be
heterogeneous. The parameter attached to the control function (Resid)
is significant in scenarios III and IV (with larger sample size).
Table 2
Mean quality perception (by Scenario) for Chianti (C), Chianti Classico (CC), Chianti Classico Riserva (CCR), Chianti Classico Gran Selezione (CCGS) by scenario,
changes in perceptions (III-IV).
C CC CCR CCGS Rosso Brunello
Scenario I Mean 71.49 69.69 81.80
S.E. Mean 1.65 2.74 2.07
Scenario II Mean 64.26 69.67 75.01 81.32
S.E. Mean 1.48 1.41 2.03 1.84
Scenario III Mean 59.24 65.45 78.63 72.09 77.95
S.E. Mean 1.32 1.13 1.08 1.98 1.89
Scenario IV Mean 53.77 58.79 74.36 77.16 66.71 78.49
S.E. Mean 1.13 1.01 0.92 0.89 1.64 1.40
All Data Mean 59.54 63.28 75.96 77.16 70.16 79.36
S.E. Mean 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.89 1.01 0.88
K Samples Median Test chi2 47.28 28.09 9.08 – 8.30 1.32
p 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.040 0.725
C CC CCR CCGS Rosso Brunello
Likert Drag Likert Drag Likert Drag Likert Drag Likert Drag Likert Drag
Constant (Avg. Qual. In Scen. III) Coeff. 66.28 53.09 70.51 61.02 81.34 76.27 – – 78.00 68.14 82.44 72.83
S.E 1.83 1.99 1.70 1.71 1.50 1.67 – – 2.85 2.85 2.32 2.86
p. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Scenario IV (Delta III vs. IV) Coeff. −5.85 −6.20 −6.53 −7.57 −2.25 −6.79 – – −6.68 −5.00 −1.47 2.25
S.E 2.28 2.56 2.11 2.20 1.86 2.15 – – 3.54 3.64 2.89 3.70
p. 0.011 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.227 0.002 – – 0.061 0.171 0.611 0.544
Fig. 3. Nonparametric density estimation of quality perceptions for Chianti
(upper panel) and Brunello (lower panel). Comparison between Scenario I
(dashed lines) and Scenario IV (solid line).
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The alternative label-specific constants (CC, CCR, CCGS, Rosso,
Brunello, C is the reference category) essentially measure label-specific
factors affecting choice not controlled by our measurement of quality
perceptions. Remaining differences could be ascribed to the different
“prestige” of each wine, perhaps a relevant factor in special occasion
purchases.10 One should be careful in drawing inferences from cross-
sample differences in the parameters (the normalizing variance could
be different), but the notable feature in Table 5 is how stable the esti-
mates of E ( )i2 are across samples. This is fully consistent with the
model presented in Eqs. (4) and (5), where the mean valuation of
Table 3
Instrumentation of quality perceptions via seemingly unrelated regression (scenarios III and IV).
Dep. Var. C CC CCR CCGS Brunello Rosso
Competitor Brunello Rosso Brunello Rosso Brunello Rosso Brunello Rosso
InfoLabel −1.882 −0.383 −0.081 0.517 −1.524 −1.976 0.090 0.235 −0.084 7.658
InfoNum 0.145 −0.389 −0.006 −0.073 0.488 1.994* 0.315 −1.770* −0.431 2.098
CompTable 3.143 −1.037 −3.429 1.584 −5.279** −7.587** 3.095 7.999** 7.542** −11.973**
Frame1 −4.941** −0.892 2.844 0.957 0.711 −3.637 −1.580 1.038 −2.234 −7.148**
C – – 0.711*** 0.807*** 0.108** 0.375*** −0.050 -0.305*** -0.372*** −0.094
CC 0.991*** 0.991*** – – 0.117* -0.236*** 0.106* 0.354*** 0.408*** 0.289***
CCR 0.157** 0.389*** 0.116* -0.200*** – – 0.695*** 0.697*** 0.247*** -0.170*
CCGS −0.063 -0.344*** 0.101* 0.324*** 0.665*** 0.751*** – – 0.247*** 0.207**
Brunello -0.297*** – 0.232*** – 0.140*** – 0.147*** – – –
Rosso – −0.050 – 0.118*** – -0.083* – 0.0950** – –
Cons 13.999** −1.043 −14.383*** −3.862 0.908 14.022** 7.307 18.227*** 37.328*** 46.454***
N 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
R-sq 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.39 0.21 0.34 0.16 0.13 0.07
Chi2 509.8*** 604.62*** 576.99*** 585.05*** 353.41*** 265.37*** 307.03*** 250.5*** 98.91*** 34.5***
InfoLabel −2.264 2.783 −0.186 −1.120 7.281* 5.244 – – 6.622 1.578
InfoNum −0.417 −2.937 1.706 0.402 −3.423** 2.159 – – −1.287 −0.894
CompTable −3.689 10.139** −1.062 −5.923 4.225 −3.823 – – 8.329 0.796
Frame1 −5.935** −3.855 1.749 −0.292 5.481** 2.184 – – −9.450*** −9.002**
C – – 0.657*** 0.625*** 0.111 0.185*** – – -0.208** −0.107
CC 0.983*** 0.828*** – – 0.469*** 0.352*** – – −0.062 0.031
CCR 0.120 0.219** 0.321*** 0.322*** – – – – 0.790*** 0.345***
CCGS – – – – – – – – – –
Brunello -0.127** – −0.018 – 0.420*** – – – – –
Rosso – −0.067 – 0.011 – 0.169*** – – –
Cons 1.675 −1.864 −1.429 3.939 8.394 22.808*** – – 32.988*** 55.789***
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 – – 150 150
R-sq 0.50 0.32 0.50 0.34 0.33 0.23 – 0.17 0.05
Chi2 321.17*** 191.3*** 355.86*** 216.73*** 163.74*** 83.37*** – – 88.69*** 16.46***
*,**,*** indicate significance at alpha=0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.
Table 4
Survey choice shares* and percent of value** (in parenthesis) for Every day consumption and special occasion.
Chianti Comp.
Occasion Sc. N* C CC CCR CCGS Rosso None
Every Day 1 75 56.7 (67.5) – – – 18.2 (32.5) 25.1
2 125 54.3 (55.6) 4.8 (10.6) – – 22 (33.8) 18.9
3 150 57.8 (54.9) 5.8 (11.9) 1.9 (6.0) – 19.1 (27.2) 15.3
4 250 50.6 (44.4) 5 (9.5) 2.2 (6.4) 2.4 (8.8) 23.4 (30.8) 16.3
Special 1 75 29.1 (24.9 – – – 58.4 (75.1) 12.4
2 125 9.5 (5.5) 48.7 (61.4) – – 37.9 (33.1) 3.9
3 150 5.7 (2.2) 16.2 (13.6) 57.8 (74.8) – 16.1 (9.4) 4.1
4 250 5.4 (1.8) 10.3 (7.3) 25.4 (27.8) 40.9 (56.0) 14.4 (7.1) 3.5
Occasion Sc. N* C CC CCR CCGS Brunello None
Every Day 1 75 76.3 (83.1) – – – 3.1 (16.9) 20.6
2 125 67.2 (71.2) 8.6 (19.8) – – 1.7 (9.0) 22.5
3 150 69.9 (58.8) 10.7 (19.5) 4.3 (12.1) – 2.3 (9.7) 12.8
4 250 70.3 (64.0) 8.3 (16.4) 3 (9.1) 1.2 (4.6) 1.3 (5.9) 16
Special 1 75 10.9 (2.6) – – – 80.7 (97.4) 8.4
2 125 5.7 (1.6) 31.9 (19.5) – – 56.1 (78.9) 6.2
3 150 6.4 (1.7) 12.7 (7.2) 25.1 (21.8) – 53.3 (69.4) 2.6
4 250 4.3 (1.1) 9.8 (5.4) 14.5 (12.2) 24.2 (25.5) 44.1 (55.8) 3.1
* Each participant in N made 12 choices.
** Calculated with the median prices used in the experiments.
10 Prestige can be conceptualized as one’s perception of how other people or
“experts” evaluate the wine, which does not necessarily coincide with an
(footnote continued)
individual’s perceptions of quality. We considered eliciting the perceived
prestige of a wine at the early stages of the design, but then decided to omit this
construct from the final version of the survey because of collinearity and survey
length concerns.
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quality ( ) does not change with the number of differentiating labels,
but quality perceptions could (Eq. (6)).
We now can leverage this model to determine the extent to which the
substitutions observed after introducing a higher-quality product can be
traced to choice availability and/or restructuring of perceptions, as pointed
in Eq. (6). Driven by our original motivation, we focus the simulation ex-
ercise on the transition from scenario III to IV, capturing the effect of the
introduction of CCGS by the Chianti Classico Consortium. The identification
strategy is to use the model to predict market shares in a market including
CCGS, but hold quality perceptions for existing labels at the pre-CCGS levels,
so that choice availability effects are isolated. To this end, we re-estimated
the empirical model in Eq. (11) using the whole sample, with scenario-
specific (I through IV) label intercepts, but joint slope estimates for the Price,
Resid, and the random parameter i2 for QualExp. Results are presented on
the right-hand-side of Table 5 and show (statistically significant) negative
price effects and positive, heterogeneous valuation of quality. Label-specific
intercepts change across scenarios, but the consistent recognizable thread is
that, holding quality perceptions and prices constant, Brunello is the most
prestigious wine, followed by CCGS, CCR, CC, Rosso and the base Chianti.
Predicted shares of volume and value are presented in Table 6 for a
simulated scenario including both Rosso and Brunello as competitor,11
where we also report the source (i.e. scenario) of the estimated parameters
and perceptions used in the simulation, the price, and the mean quality
perceptions (see also Table 2). In terms of volume, the market share of
Chianti goes from significantly trailing Montalcino wines in Scenario III
(38% Chianti vs. 52.4% Montalcino), to a position of market leadership
(51.0% Chianti vs. 38.3% Montalcino) in Scenario IV, making headway in
the premium special occasion market segment. This jump is even more
evident when considering market value, where the total Chianti share goes
from 31% to 50.4%. When made available, CCGS captures 23.5% of the
special occasion choices (27.9% of value), even though only =51 38 13%
of the market is gained from competitors or non-purchase decision, and the
remaining 10.5% is cannibalized from other Chianti wines.
The third set of estimates in Table 6 show market shares re-esti-
mated for Scenario IV, but holding quality perceptions constant at the
scenario III estimates for all wines, except, obviously, CCGS. We find
that, without restructuring of perceptions, the total Chianti share would
sum up to 53.5% (54.1% of value), which implies that =53.5 51 2.5%
(3.7% in value) of the market is lost due to the restructuring of per-
ception and comparative stigma. To put this in perspective, about a
fourth =(2.5/10.5 24%)of the cannibalized choice share is owed to re-
structuring of perceptions and comparative stigma, while the remaining
80% is owed to the availability of a new choice.
5. Conclusions, policy implications, limitations and future resarch
Motivated by the case of the Chianti Classico wine consortium
strategy, we study vertical differentiation via multi-tier quality certifi-
cation labels tied to a Geographical Indication (GI). First, we model
Table 5
Estimated parameters for the random quality model (special occasion choices). scenario-specific and whole sample estimates.a
Split Sample Scenario-Specific Intercepts
Variable Sc. I Sc. II Sc. III Sc. IV Joint Slopes I II III IV
CC 1.810 1.151 0.798 1.741 0.998 0.895
0.097 0.098 0.080 0.082 0.090 0.078
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CCR 1.996 1.150 1.722 1.356
0.127 0.092 0.096 0.086




Rosso 0.942 1.144 0.348 0.566 0.758 1.101 0.308 0.616
0.115 0.110 0.118 0.093 0.104 0.107 0.113 0.093
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
Brunello 3.530 2.375 2.917 1.771 2.109 2.156 2.433 2.104
0.409 0.213 0.173 0.121 0.151 0.123 0.118 0.107
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NoChoice −1.514 −1.615 −2.678 −1.420 −1.329 −1.333 −2.365 −1.631
0.695 0.258 0.287 0.174 0.290 0.208 0.221 0.162
0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Price −0.067 −0.016 −0.029 0.003 −0.010
0.014 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.003
0.000 0.031 0.000 0.366 0.000
QualExp 0.043 0.045 0.050 0.043 0.045
0.012 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.003
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Resid −0.005 0.000 −0.006 −0.007 −0.005
0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
0.536 0.855 0.028 0.000 0.000
SD
QualExp 0.067 0.075 0.097 0.076 0.079
0.008 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.003
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ll −1095 −2542 −3688 −7837 −15,188
aic 2204.1 5101.5 7394.6 15,694.5 30,419.9
bic 2250.3 5160.6 7464.8 15,779.4 30,621.8
chi2 553.9 1024.5 1206.9 1814.7 4588.2
a Each set of estimates include coefficient, standard error, and p-value.
11 We also simulated market shares including only Rosso and only Brunello,
but omit these results for brevity. Note that the Rosso+Brunello scenario may
somewhat overestimate the total market share captured by the Montalcino
wines, as substitution effects between Rosso and Brunello were not estimable
given the experimental design. Results from the Brunello only scenario are most
similar to what is presented in Table 6.
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how multi-tier labeling affects the quality output of a GI, and empiri-
cally test three competing hypotheses describing how consumer per-
ceptions are altered by the introduction of a new quality tier. The
fundamental point we raise is that consumers may interpret quality
signals (including food labels) in a contextual rather than absolute
manner; so that introducing new quality signals leads to a reassessment
of the meaning and usefulness of other related cues.
Based on subjective ratings from an online experiment, the common
assumption that consumers are well-informed and have rational quality
expectations is rejected, but so is the polar opposite that consumers
interpret new quality certification as independent from other labels
from the same GI. The comparative stigma hypothesis on the other hand
is not rejected, implying that introducing a new quality tier cheapens
the perceived quality of pre-existing certifications marketed under the
same GI umbrella. This results fits within the nascent agricultural
economics literature investigating how food labels can change percep-
tion of unlabeled products (see, for example Kanter et al. (2009) or
Costanigro and Lusk (2014)), providing additional impetus for ex-
panding this line of research.
While the existing literature on GIs has treated quality signals as
objective and uniformly understood by consumers, in this article we
present a novel theoretical and empirical framework to study consumer
choice in markets for vertically differentiated goods, where quality is
credence or experience in nature. Our work extends previous models of
demand for GI labels by introducing quality perceptions endogenous to
the labeling regime, so that preferences for higher quality (i.e. choice
availability) can be separated from the effects of perception re-
structuring.
The results of most immediate policy relevance are summarized in
Fig. 4, where we graph the market share values (from Table 6) before
the introduction of CCGS, after, and the effect of netting out the re-
structuring of quality perceptions caused by the new label. In the si-
mulated environment of a choice experiment where Chianti wines
compete with Montalcino wines, the introduction of the CCGS label
increases the total share of Chianti wines from 31% of the market value
to 50.4%, while Montalcino falls from 69% to 49.6%. This demonstrates
how introducing a higher tier quality label, the Gran Selezione, is an
effective tool to compete in the premium and ultra-premium market
segments supported by special occasion purchases.
Additional evidence of the success of the Gran Selezione is provided
by the label’s adoption rates in the Chianti Classico area of production.
According to the consortium12, the number of wineries producing Gran
Selezione increased from 35 wineries in 2014 (out of 392 producers) to
95 in 2017. As we mentioned before, the general tenet in the industry is
that the high-quality market segment allows wineries to charge sub-
stantive markups (Bidmead, 2012), and the limited information we
have on production costs appears to confirm this. A study by Marone
et al. (2017) assessed the median cost of production for a Brunello di
Montalcino at €9.28, while the median (retail level) price we adopted
here was €30.00. In sum, the multi-tier strategy of the Chianti Classico
consortium increases the number of choices available to consumers
while providing farmers’ with new avenues to profitability, which is
consistent with the intent of the EU GI directives (EU 1151/2012).
Even though the upwards expansion of the quality certification tiers
appears to be a successful strategy from the perspective of the whole GI,
this does not necessarily mean that all firms in a consortium will gain
from it. Our findings show that the concern raised by Mr. Poggiali was a
reasonable one, and indeed introducing the Gran Riserva cheapens how
consumers perceive the quality of other Chianti wines. Based on our
simulations, the most heavily impacted wine was the CC Riserva, suf-
fering from significant cannibalization (from 25.1% to 18.2% of market
value) attributable, at least in part, to the negative comparative stigma
effects (holding perceived quality constant, the share would have been
22.7%, rather than 18.2%).
This highlights some important distributional tradeoffs. While the
upward expansion strategy may make sense from a GI perspective, the
Gran Selezione causes a transfer of revenue from wineries producing
CCR as top quality to those producing CCGS. Sergio Zingarelli, pre-
sident of the Consortium and an early promoter of the Gran Selezione
labeling scheme,13 was quoted by the magazine Wine Enthusiast
(O’Keefe, 2015) touting how “even some producers who initially spoke
out against Gran Selezione are now making one, or planning on doing
so”. In many cases, the adoption of the new label may have been a
forced choice, dictated by the need to avoid losing market to other firms
Table 6
Simulated choice shares and value shares (median prices) for special occasion purchases under different labeling regimes and scenarios.
Competitor
Treatment Wine Price QualExp Choice Shares Value Shares
Params. Qualexp € Share Totals Totals
3 3 C 6 59.24 3.1% 38.0% 0.9% 31.0%
3 3 CC 13 65.45 8.2% 5.0%
3 3 CCR 20 78.63 26.7% 25.1%
3 3 Rosso 9 72.09 5.1% 52.4% 2.2% 69.0%
3 3 Brunello 30 77.95 47.3% 66.8%
3 3 None 0 0 9.6% 9.6% –
4 4 C 6 53.77 2.6% 51.0% 0.7% 50.4%
4 4 CC 13 58.79 5.8% 3.6%
4 4 CCR 20 74.36 19.1% 18.2%
4 4 CCGS 25 77.16 23.5% 27.9%
4 4 Rosso 9 66.71 5.1% 38.3% 2.2% 49.6%
4 4 Brunello 30 78.49 33.2% 47.4%
4 4 None 0 0 10.7% 10.7% –
4 3 C 6 59.24 2.5% 53.5% 0.7% 54.1%
4 3 CC 13 65.45 6.2% 4.0%
4 3 CCR 20 78.63 23.1% 22.7%
4 4 CCGS 25 77.16 21.7% 26.7%
4 3 Rosso 9 72.09 5.9% 35.3% 2.6% 45.9%
4 3 Brunello 30 77.95 29.4% 43.3%
4 3 None 0 0 11.2% 11.2% – –
12 Chianti Classico consortium, personal communication.
13 For the curious reader, Rocca delle Macìe, the Estate owned by Sergio
Zingarelli, does produce a Chianti Classico Gran Selezione.
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within the consortium. More in general, GI consortia will want to en-
sure that no members face exogenous constraints in adopting the new
label, or will likely face souring relationships.
In this article we take a substantive first step in studying multi-tier
GI certification, but a number of limitation and caveats remain. For one,
the sample we reached was representative of Italian wine consumers
(inside and outside of Tuscany), but we did not consider the export and
international markets, which can play an important role for high
quality wines. The fundamental question is whether consumers abroad
will recognize the new Gran Selezione as a signal of quality. The few
studies considering the effect of GIs in international markets (e.g. see
Menapace et al., 2011 on perceptions of Mediterranean olive oils in
Canada) suggest that consumers may be more swayed by country of
origin information, paying little attention to specific GI designations
and distinctions. However, the success of Brunello di Montalcino and
Bordeaux wines in the export markets suggests that higher price, high
involvement consumption choices may yield different outcomes.
From a methodological standpoint, concerns over tractability lead
us to abstract from brand reputation dynamics, and yet it is possible
that the perceived quality of a GI and comparative stigma effects may
interact with the reputation of a specific winery. Pursuing this line of
research would perhaps entail expanding on the brand/collective
theory framework presented in Menapace and Moschini (2011) and the
empirical approach adopted in Costanigro et al. (2010). Another re-
levant matter is determining how the optimal number of tiers in a given
GI changes depending on the product and market conditions, as meta-
analytical evidence shows that the effectiveness of GIs in inducing
product differentiation varies (Deselnicu et al., 2013). This could be
done via simulation (as in Costanigro et al., 2012), but a more detailed
knowledge of production costs is necessary.
Fig. 4. Market shares (as % of total $ value of choices) before the introduction of CCGS (top panel), after its introduction (middle panel), and holding quality
perceptions constant (lower panel).
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The elephant in the room is the unresolved issue of appropriately
representing and measuring how people form and use quality ex-
pectations, so a fundamental point in need of further scrutiny is the
robustness of our results to the adoption of different elicitation tools.
Unfortunately, this area of work received scant attention in the eco-
nomics literature, where quality has been most often treated as an
objective trait. For example, one could consider quality perceptions as a
strictly qualitative concept, and elicit them indirectly via quality sorting
tasks (e.g. this product is better tasting than another, see Costanigro
et al. (2015)). Validated multi-question psychometric questionnaires
(e.g. Jover et al., 2004) may yield measures with greater external va-
lidity, but complex, multidimensional constructs are hard to include in
a concise model of vertical differentiation. The likert scales we adopted
here relax the assumption of objectivity, but fit squarely with the re-
presentation of perceived quality as a spatial/cardinal concept. Recent
work by Bordalo et al. (2013) on the role of saliency in the evaluation of
price/quality tradeoffs suggests that the evaluation of quality may be
much more context-dependent than our models are willing to concede.
While this research area is currently unsettled, we are confident that
introducing subjective perceptions within the economic framework of
vertical differentiation can open the door to many important applica-
tions.
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